Compromised credentials tied to AI inference platform Fireworks AI provided attackers a path into Cursor’s systems and ultimately enabled them to distribute tampered copies of Anthropic’s Claude Code extension through Cursor’s Visual Studio Code extension marketplace. Cursor says the incident was discovered on October 29 and affected users who requested cached versions of two modified releases.
The unauthorized extensions were labeled anthropic.claude-code versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313. Cursor says they were available through its marketplace for roughly 11 hours. The company estimates that at most 5,000 users may have been affected. Anthropic was not hacked, Cursor emphasized; the malicious activity took place in Cursor’s environment.
From Fireworks credentials to Cursor systems
Cursor attributes the compromise to a sequence of intrusions at Fireworks during October. In the first incident, attackers used internal Fireworks credentials to access stored secrets, account information and billing information. In a separate incident, a third-party cloud provider was compromised, allowing attackers to reach Fireworks development machines and steal customer data.
A Cursor access key issued to Fireworks was compromised in one of those incidents. The attacker used it to copy data from a read-only storage bucket. The copied material included unredacted credentials that could provide access to software-as-a-service tools used by Cursor, according to the company.
Through those tools, the attacker accessed selected archived, non-production Cursor source-code repositories, some of which contained business contact information. Cursor also reported limited customer support data and email conversations, product usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some coding-agent conversations, and credentials users had sent to its support team.
Tampered extensions served from Cursor’s cache
Cursor says it blocked the attacker’s access after detecting unauthorized activity. However, the attacker had already taken secrets from Cursor’s internal systems and used them to place unauthorized copies of the Claude Code extension directly in the cache used to serve Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace.
The modified extensions were not present in the Open VSX marketplace source, Cursor said. Instead, users requesting the affected cached versions from Cursor’s marketplace during the exposure window could receive the tampered packages. The distinction means the reported distribution route was Cursor’s cache, rather than a compromise of Anthropic or the Open VSX source.
Cursor considers the incident contained and says it has seen no attacker activity in its environment since November 1. The company advised customers who installed or updated to version 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from the Cursor marketplace during the exposure window to follow the steps in its security notice. Cursor cautioned that uninstalling the extension alone may not be sufficient.
Broader exposure from the Fireworks compromise
The incident illustrates how credentials shared with a service provider can become a route into a customer’s development and delivery systems. In this case, access originating with Fireworks was used to obtain credentials for Cursor’s SaaS tools; those credentials then supported access to selected internal data and the marketplace cache. The reported impact spans both information held in Cursor systems and the integrity of software extensions delivered to users.
Cursor’s account also places the event within a wider set of disclosures connected to the Fireworks compromise. Notion and Uber have also reported data breaches stemming from that incident. The available information does not establish that the affected companies experienced identical access or consequences.
For users, Cursor’s notice identifies the two specific extension versions and the marketplace exposure window as the key conditions for determining whether action is needed. For organizations managing developer tools, the event underscores the importance of reviewing where extensions are obtained and verifying whether installed versions match trusted releases, particularly when a marketplace serves packages from a cache.